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Abstract 
Network security is becoming an area of concern with the expansion of wireless technology. Many businesses 
have lost a lot of money as a result of compromised network security. The Worldwide Interoperability for 
Microwave Access (WiMAX) is one example of 3G technology which is getting popular. Most business 
establishemnst use WiMAX to network their communication equipments. The popularity of WiMAX and its 
security vulnarability are the key motivation for this study. Presently, PKM versions of authentication are used to 
secure WiMAX networks. The PKM authentication methods expose the WiMAX network to third party risks like 
Man in the Middle attacks, eavesdropping and jamming attacks.  WiMAX is thus vulnerable to network attacks 
that compromise the radio links between the communicating Subscriber Station (SS) and the serving Base Station 
(BS). The PKMv1 process involves a one sided authentication. The BS authenticates the SS but the SS has no 
capacity to authenticate a BS. As a result, a rogue BS can successfully enter the network of a SS without prevention. 
The rogue BS can then tap all the unencrypted management messages. This constitutes a major security flaw. The 
Man-In- The-Middle (MITM) attack exploits this weakness in the network by eavesdropping, interception and 
fabrication of the management messages, resulting in a breach in the reliability of the entire network. In this 
research, a modification of the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol is used to mitigate the man-in-the 
middle attack in WiMAX by modeling using the Dev C++ programming language. The DH protocol uses a unique 
algorithm whose solution must be obtained by both the SS and the BS for communication to be allowed. Both the 
BS and the SS are given an opportunity to authenticate one another before any communication can proceed. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
With the deployment of wireless communication in recent years, security issues in wireless networks also become 
a growing concern [1] [2]. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and Internet Engineers 
Task Force (IETF) has proposed security mechanisms and protocols to countermeasure security breaches in a way 
that minimizes the damage  which may be caused by the attacks [4]. Even if WiMAX technology has complex 
authentication and authorization methods and a very strong encryption technique it is still vulnerable to different 
attacks or threats like jamming, scrambling, MITM or water torture attacks [8]. Privacy or confidentiality is 
fundamental for secure communication, which provides resistance to interception and eavesdropping. Man-in-the-
middle attack is another classic attack and is generally applicable in a communication protocol where mutual 
authentication is absent. Other familiar attacks include parallel session attack, reflection attack, interleaving attack, 
attack due to type flaw, attack due to name omission, and attack due to misuse of cryptographic services. PKM V1 
and PKM V2 have been used in WiMAX for security purposes [3]. The above versions only secure the data being 
transferred. It also secures the BS. The MS/SS is however left vulnerable to rogue BS [4]. The rogue BS can tap 
the management messages before the actual passing of transmitted data. This paper addresses the weaknesses in 
WiMAX security system and consequently illustrates how DH can help improve the WiMAX network security. 
MITH takes advantage of the absence of mutual authentication to pose threats to the system [3].  
1.1 Objective 
The main objective of this paper is to highlight the application of DH algorithm in WiMAX mutual authentication 
 
2 DIFFIE HELLMAN ALGORITHM  
The latest standard, IEEE 802.16e-2005, includes a new version (PKMv2) of the protocol that caters for the 
shortcomings of the first version. PKMv1 does not have a capacity for mutual authentication. Furthermore PKMv2 
supports two different mechanisms for authentication: the SS and the BS may use RSA-based authentication or 
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) -based authentication [21]. This is because the RSA based 
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authentication applies X.509 digital certificates together with RSA encryption. Authentication is therefore made 
more secure. However, the exchange of vital management information is done before securing the network.  In the 
PKMv2, the BS asks the SS for its certificates and manufacturing IDs. The BS also sends its management 
information details to SS in the public environment. Such vital information can be tapped by a rogue Station.  
Mutual authentication takes place in PKMv2 only after the transfer of management information. This is where DH 
algorithm comes in handy. DH carries out authentication first before the exchange of management information 
gets transferred.  
The basic version of the Diffie-Hellman protocol is implemented as described below:  
Let  
 = b mod P   1 
 = a mod P   2 
Where: 
• PkMS is the mobile Station’s public key 
• PkBS is the base Station’s public key 
• G and P are global variables called primes numbers 
• G is a primitive root of P. 
• ‘Na’ and ‘Nb’ are the private keys of the MS and the BS respectively. 
 In the basic version of DH, after the respective exchange of the public keys, the MS and the BS calculate the 
shared encryption key as shown in the equations 1 and 2. In order to implement mutual authentication, AS sends 
Na to BS, BS calculates AKB [6], [7]. BS then sends another unique number Nb to SS. Similarly, SS calculates 
AKS. If AKS is equal to AKB, AS believes this message sent by BS [8]. The AK in both SS and BS is calculated 
as follows: 
	
 = b mod P = GNa mod P 3 
The equation 3 illustrates the implementation of DH protocol. 
 
Figure 1: Implementation procedure for DH 
Key 
Na- Unique number from SS 
Nb- Unique number from BS 
AKB- BS authentication key 
 
3 The Diffie Hellman mutual authentication code 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH) is a cryptographic protocol that allows two parties that have no prior 
knowledge of each other to establish together a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel [2] 
[5]. Then they use this key to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric-key cipher. The scheme was 
first published publicly by Whitfield Diffie and Martin [4]. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the implementation procedure of the proposed protocol. The SS sends a number 
Na to the BS. The BS then sends another unique number Nb to SS. BS calculates a unique authentication key using 
the number received from the SS. The SS also calculates a unique authentication key using the number received 
from the BS. The two results obtained from the calculations must be the same for authentication is to succeed. 
Communication will be terminated if AKS and AKB are not the same. The mutual authentication code for DH 
protocol is programmed in Dev C ++ as shown in the code at the appendix section. The following code is written 
SS sends its 
 
BS sends its Nb to SS 
BS calculates AK  
SS Calculates AK 
AKS = 
Allow communication  
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in Dev C++. This program has the mutual authentication functions that illustrate DH algorithm.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Dev C ++ allows for the demonstration of DH mutual authentication. The above code is written to help a BS and 
an SS to communicate one to another and in the process establish a shared authentication key that is later used to 
access the network [1]. The Responder commits to a protocol session with the Initiator if, and only if, it has 
correctly finished the session with the Initiator. The Responder will only commit to the Initiator if the latter is 
correctly authenticated by the Responder and the same applies to the Initiator, if it correctly validates the identity 
of the Responder as expressed in the challenge response process of the model. In the equations above, Nb is the 
nonce generated by the Responder, while Na is the nonce generated by Initiator. 
 Equation 3 explains that a shared authentication key must be obtained if two parties are to communicate. 
The results obtained in figure 2 below show the mutual authentication process. The SS selects its first number to 
be used in the DH algorithm. This number is used to obtain that calculation result. The result is then sent to BS in 
a public non secured environment [4]. The BS equally selects its number then sends the result of calculation. The 
two equipments only arrive at the same solution to the algorithm is they have the right formula. A wrong result is 
obtained is an equipment has a wring algorithm. This translates to a MITH. Suspicious equipment can never get 
the right solution to the challenge because the algorithm is only known to legitimate BS and SS [8]. A legitimate 
station will always get the correct solution to the algorithm challenge. It is also necessary to have more than one 
trial on the algorithm challenge. This means that a legitimate station can sometimes miss the correct choice of 
number in the initial attempt. DH algorithm helps two stations which have no prior knowledge of one another to 
establish a common authentication key. System details can then be exchanged once the shared authentication key 
is obtained.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
Privacy or confidentiality is fundamental for secure communication, which provides resistance to interception and 
eavesdropping. Message authentication provides integrity of the message and sender authentication, corresponding 
to the security attacks of message modification and impersonation. Even if WiMAX technology has complex 
authentication and authorization methods and a very strong encryption technique, it is still vulnerable to different 
attacks or threats like jamming, scrambling, MITM or water torture attacks [8].  
The results show that the DH protocol works to keep away any intruder in the network. The goal of DH 
is to carry out mutual authentication. The process of solving the algorithm is complex and only known by the 
legitimate communication gadgets. Any MITH is kept at bay since they do not have the knowledge of the protocol. 
Diffie Hellmann protocol algorithm introduces mutual authentication between the BS and SS prior to the exchange 
of any management information. WiMAX is selected for this research because it is a recent technology and is 
presently being rolled out in many parts of the world because of its broadband capacities. Further research is 
needed on the actual implementation of DH protocol in new mobile devices lke smart phones and Ipads.  
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Figure 2: Results of compilation  
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Appendix  
Implementation Code:  
 
#include <iostream> 
#include <math.h> 
using namespace std; 
int main () 
{ 
cout << "\n\n\t\t" ; 
 int g, a, p, b, b2, A, X, B, Y, C, D, E, F, K1, K2 ; 
 cout << "SS to enter its unique number\n\n"; 
  g = 5; 
  p = 7; // the SS and BS agree to use same values of g and p. such an agreement is set at the point of 
manufacture 
cout << "\n\n\t\t" ; 
 cin >> a ; // the SS selects its unique number for computation  
 cout << "\n\n\t\t\t" ; 
  A = pow (g, a); 
  cout << "the first SS computation result is \n\n\n\t\t" ; 
  B =  A % p ;   
 cout << B ; // this is the value obtained by the SS 
 cout << "\n\n\t\t"; 
 // X is then sent by the SS across the network to the BS.  
 cout << " BS to enter its first unique number \n\n\t\t" ; 
 cin >> b ; // BS selects its unique number for computation 
 cout << "\n\n" ; 
 C = pow (g, b) ;  
cout << "\n\n\t\t" ; 
D = C % p; 
 cout << "the BS computation result is: \n\n\t\t"; 
 cout << D ; 
 cout << "\n\n\t\t" ; 
 cout << "SS sends its result to BS and BS equally sends its result to SS. these received values are used in 
step two calculation \n\n" ; 
E = pow (D, a) ;  
cout << "\n\n\t\t" ; 
K1 = E % p ; 
cout << "the authentication key obtained from SS is: \n\n\t\t" ; 
cout << K1 ; 
cout << "\n\n" ;  
F = pow (C, a); 
cout << "\n\n" ; 
K2 =   F % p ; 
cout << "\n\n\t\t" ; 
cout << "The authentication key obtained from BS is: \n\n\t\t" ; 
cout << K2; 
 cout << "\n\n\t\t" ;  
 if ( K1 == K2)  
 { 
 cout << "value  is the same mutual authentication has been obtained continue with communication the network is 
secure\n\n\t\t" ; 
 } 
 else  
 { cout << " mutual authentication not obtained. try again\n\n\t\t" ; 
 cout << "SS to enter its unique number for second attempt \n\n\t\t"; 
} 
